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TOWARD A MORE EXPANSIVE WELFARE DEVOLUTION DEBATE
by
Steven D. Schwinn
Leading up to and in the wake of national welfare reform, commentators,
scholars, and advocates debated one of the key ingredients in the 1996
legislation: devolution of responsibilityfor the design and administration
of welfare from the federal government to the states. Pro-devolutionists
arguedthat devolution would create 50 state welfare experiments, would
result in welfare programs tailored to the unique needs of individual
states, and would lead to a race to the top in the quality of welfare
programs. Anti-devolutionists argued that devolution would encourage
states to compete to repel welfare recipients, to avoid becoming welfare
magnets, and, ultimately, to race to the bottom in the quality of welfare
services. These polarpositions defined-and continue to define-much, if
not all, of the welfare devolution debate.
But these arguments are really just two sides of the same coin-polar
positions rooted in the same fundamental assumption-andthis universe
of rhetoric is thus unduly constrained. To see this point, this Article
attempts to trace the predominantarguments in the devolution debate to
a common intellectual root, neo-Tieboutian jurisdictional competition.
Viewed in this light, the Article argues, the predominant rhetoric reflects
just one dimension of what ought to be a much more diverse debate. By
expanding the debate to include such considerations as political
participation,community, and equality and justice, the Article suggests
that the debate-and, indeed, options for welfare federalism-can and
ought to be much richer.
1.
II.
III.
IV .

INTR O DUC TIO N .....................................................................................
TIEBOUT'S MODEL AND JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION .........
NEO-TIEBOUTIAN RHETORIC IN THE DEBATE ON WELFARE
RE FO RM ...................................................................................................
SORTIN G PRIN CIPLES ..........................................................................
A. Endogenous SortingPrinciples.........................................................
1. The Knowledge Assumption ........................................................
2. Externalities................................................................................
3. The Mobility Assumption .............................................................

312
316
322
333
334
334
336
337

Assistant Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. Many thanks to faculty
participants for their thoughtful reactions and suggestions at a spring 2004 workshop
sponsored by the University of Maryland Law School. Thanks also to Lauren Lyon and
Jennifer Rupert for their valuable research assistance. This Article was supported by the
Dean through a faculty research grant.

HeinOnline -- 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 311 2005

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
B.

V.

[Vol. 9:2

Exogenous Sorting Principles...................................
338
1. PoliticalParticipation......................................
338
2. Comm unity .............................................
34 1
3. Equality and Justice.......................................
343

CON C LU SIO N ....................................................
345

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),' more commonly known as
federal "welfare reform." Congress designed the Act to address what it
identified as several intractable problems in the welfare system: long-term
dependency (and inter-generational dependency) on welfare benefits, out-ofwedlock pregnancies in the welfare population, and the lack of two-parent
families.2 In order to address these issues, the Act included provisions to
require recipients to participate in work activities as a condition of receipt of

benefits, 3 to limit the
length of time that recipients may receive benefits,4 and to
5

promote marriage.
Although these provisions represented important and fundamental changes
in the federal approach to welfare, there were even more dramatic changes in
the PRWORA: the Act eliminated the federal welfare entitlement for
recipients 6 and devolved primary responsibility for welfare from the federal
government to the states. 7 The Act effected this devolution through the
formation of a federal block-grant to the states, s replacing the previous federalstate administrative and financing arrangement known as "cooperative
federalism." 9 The elimination of the federal entitlement in combination with
devolution gave the states far greater latitude in designing, administering, and
implementing their welfare programs.'°
This devolution approach to welfare-a hallmark of what many call the
"New Federalism"-was driven largely by proponents' desire to increase state

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
2 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2)-(4) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 607(a)(1) (2000).
4 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2000).
' 42 U.S.C. § 602 (2000) (requiring states to "[e]stablish goals and take action to
prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies" as part of their outline of a
family assistance program required for eligibility for block-grants).
6 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2000).
8

Id.

.9 See

King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) (coining the term "cooperative
federalism" to refer to programs that are administered and funded jointly by the federal and
state governments).
" 42 U.S.C. § 617 (2000) ("No officer or employee of the Federal Government may
regulate the conduct of States under this part or enforce any provision of this part, except to
the extent expressly provided in this part.").
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flexibility and experimentation in the welfare arena, allowing each state to
tailor its program more precisely to local social, political, and economic
conditions within that state. Opponents of devolution responded that devolution
and the lack of federal standards, including the federal entitlement to benefits,
would cause states to engage in a "race to the bottom" as they design welfare
programs to repel poor citizens (and thus avoid becoming "welfare magnets")
and to attract and retain non-poor (taxpaying) citizens. A debate about
devolution in the welfare arena was thus framed around issues of state
flexibility, experimentation, and jurisdictional competition. This debate raged
in the legal literature, in the social science literature, in Congress and the states,
and even in the courts (although, as described infra, the Supreme Court in
Saenz v. RoeI effectively put an end to these debates in the courts). The
welfare devolution debate continues to occupy space in the public discourse
about welfare reform: it remains a prominent part of academic and policy
evaluations of the original PRWORA and is re-emerging in Congress as
Congress considers variations of welfare devolution through reauthorization of
the PRWORA and as Congress debates devolution proposals for Food Stamps
and Medicaid. The broader welfare devolution debate considered in this Article
cuts across welfare programs and expands from the original policy debates over
the devolution in the PRWORA to the current devolution debates in the context
of reauthorization of the PRWORA and in the context of other current welfare
reform proposals. This Article considers all of these debates together-as the
"welfare devolution debate"-and distinguishes between devolution debates on
particular welfare programs only where such distinction is helpful to elucidate a
rhetorical point in the debate.
The predominant rhetoric' 2 in the welfare devolution debateexperimentation and flexibility, state responsiveness to local needs, and "race
to the bottom" versus "race to the top"--has an intuitive appeal. After all, we
can easily imagine two hypothetical and contiguous states availing themselves
of newfound flexibility and designing welfare programs to better meet the
unique demands of their individual situations. And we can imagine that a
policy that unleashes two programs (one for each state)-as opposed to a policy
that protects a monopolistic single program (for the federation of the two
states)-would seem to allow greater experimentation in the design of
programs. We can imagine that these experiments, through trial-and-error and
information sharing, should eventually result in better overall policy. We might
also reasonably intuit that our two states, being closer to their citizens than the
federal government, would be in a better situation to tailor individualized
" 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
12

The other notable argument in the welfare devolution debate centers on the funding

formula in the PRWORA. Because the PRWORA allocates funds to states through a block
grant-as opposed to a cost-sharing formula under the AFDC program-states lose their
incentive to spend their own funds on TANF programs and federal funds decline over time
in real terms. Although the debate over the funding formula in the PRWORA is certainly
relevant for any discussion of federal-state relationships in the program, this debate tends to
focus on the amount of federal money and incentives for states to spend funds on welfare
programs, not which level of government is responsible for the design and implementation of
those programs. The latter question is the focus of this Article.
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programs for their poor and to respond to the needs of all their citizens. Thus,
pro-devolution arguments have some intuitive appeal on the basis of state
flexibility and responsiveness to local needs.
But we can also easily imagine that these two hypothetical states would
observe each other closely in designing their programs, because the states will
reasonably anticipate that relatively generous programs will attract migrating
poor from the other state, while relatively stingy programs will repel them. The
more generous state may therefore reasonably expect an influx of poor from its
neighbor. We may reasonably intuit that each state will attempt to avoid
attracting the poor (because they-are perceived to be expensive, unappealing
citizens) and that each state will therefore seek to provide benefits that are not
relatively generous. Because the states observe each other in designing their
programs, a competition will ensue, in which each state's welfare program
exerts downward pressure on the welfare program of the other state until both
states reach an equilibrium bottom-which is severely detrimental to the poor
in both states. Thus, anti-devolution arguments have some intuitive appeal
based on the notion that states will want to avoid becoming "welfare magnets"
and therefore will engage in a "race to the bottom."
The attractiveness and ubiquity of these intuitive arguments can be
illustrated by the observation that they have essentially comprised the entire
lexicon in the welfare devolution debate. These same arguments-or thinly
veiled facsimiles-appear throughout the public discourse in academia, the
popular press, policy institutions, and even the courts. Indeed, as described
more fully below, 13 it is difficult to find a public statement in the welfare
devolution debate that does not somehow conform to the essential language and
ideas of these arguments.
This is problematic because, while the arguments appear to represent polar
positions on a uni-dimensional devolution spectrum, these arguments in fact
represent variant positions in only a single dimension of a much more
complicated, multi-dimensional spectrum. In other words, the lexicon of the
devolution debate fails to account for other relevant principles in considering
how to sort out federal-state relations in the design and delivery of welfare
programs.
We can gain a window into the myopia of the debate by tracing these
arguments to a common intellectual root, Charles Tiebout's famous 1956
article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.14 Tiebout's singular contribution
was to establish a market paradigm in the allocation of public goods, thus
showing that public goods could be allocated in an economically optimal way,
given certain rigid assumptions. 15 Tiebout's market is comprised of local
governments, each offering a unique tax-benefit package, coupled with full
citizen mobility and knowledge, such that citizens "vote with their feet" and
migrate to the jurisdiction that best satisfies their tax-benefit preferences.' 6 The
See infra Part Ill.
14Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416
(1956).
15See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
16 Tiebout, supra note 14, at 418.
'3
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model's central assumptions of local responsiveness and citizen mobility thus
combine
to achieve a market-like equilibrium in the provision of local public
17
goods.

Tiebout's original economic model evolved through subsequent scholars,
social scientists, and policymakers into a model of "jurisdictional competition,"
in which local jurisdictions actively compete to attract certain citizens (and
repel others) by adopting appealing (or distasteful) tax-benefit packages. Thus,
jurisdictions use their flexibility to experiment with different policies in an
attempt to satisfy citizen preferences, i.e., they "race to the top" by providing
optimal tax-benefit packages for their citizens. But for some policies-those
that benefit groups that the majority perceives to be a drag on state resourcesjurisdictional competition theory predicts that states satisfy majority citizen
preferences by repelling these presumably undesirable citizens by diminishing
programs that benefit them. States thus act to avoid becoming "magnets" for
these citizens by engaging in a "race to the bottom" in policies that benefit
them. The lexicon and ideas of the neo-Tieboutian jurisdictional competition
model-and, even more narrowly, the specific assumption of full citizen
mobility within that model-then, exactly match the lexicon and ideas of the
devolution debate.
Grounding the devolution debate exclusively in this neo-Tieboutian
rhetoric results in an incomplete array of possibilities for federal-state
relationships in providing welfare services. There are several endogenous
reasons for this-reasons that grow out of flaws in the jurisdictional
competition model itself, as it is applied to redistributional programs. 18 First,
welfare recipients occupy a unique place within a jurisdictional competition
model; they are, at the same time, citizen-voters (with or without political
power), direct recipients of (politically unpopular) government largesse, and
mobile externalities of an economy or social system. Tiebout's model and its
jurisdictional competition progeny do not fully account for these complex
relationships between welfare recipients and the state. Second, jurisdictional
competition does not account for varying bureaucratic competencies among
governments and informational economies of scale within governments. For
example, the model fails to properly account for the unique expertise of the
federal government based upon its experiences with more than 50 state
bureaucracies and welfare programs. Third, according to the vast (and
increasing) social science literature, the most we can say about the rigid
Tiebout assumptions is that we do not know if they are satisfied in the secondbest real world. For example, the vast and increasing research on Tiebout's
central assumption of citizen mobility has produced little conclusive evidence
(either way) on whether welfare recipients actually migrate based on state
welfare benefit levels, or, put another way, whether we actually observe the
Id. at 420.
18 For a thorough examination of problems with the jurisdictional competition model
more generally, see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
JurisdictionalCompetition: DevolutionaryFederalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J.
201 (1997). For a similar critique from an economic perspective, see Truman F. Bewley, A
Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 ECONOMETRICA 713 (1981).
'7
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"opportunistic welfare migration" that we would expect in a first-best
jurisdictional competition world.
It is not my primary intent here, however, to weigh-in in any serious way
in the debate on the accuracy or usefulness of the jurisdictional competition
model. Instead, I intend to comment on the nature of the debate itself. I argue
that we ought to expand the very parameters of the devolution debate to include
other factors, some endogenous and some exogenous to the jurisdictional
competition model but nevertheless relevant to federal-state relationships in
welfare programs. 19 Considerations of citizen knowledge and externalities are
two principles endogenous to the model that may help us sort out appropriate
governmental roles. Political participation, community values, and
considerations of equality and justice are three principles exogenous to the
model that may serve a sorting function. 2 ) Looking beyond the limited spaces
of economics, and considering citizens outside of their economic selves, we
may discover new ideas for welfare federalism.
This Article first closely examines Tiebout's original hypothesis and the
neo-Tieboutian theory of jurisdictional competition. Next, the Article attempts
to ground the devolution debate in academia, the press, policy institutions, and
the courts in a neo-Tieboutian framework. It argues that the devolution debate
is rooted in neo-Tieboutian rhetoric.
The Article then identifies some additional relevant considerations, or
sorting principles, that have been absent from the debate. These principles help
illustrate the myopia of the current debate and the resultant paucity of welfare
federalism possibilities. The Article suggests how an expanded debate, with an
expanded array of principles, might result in a richer, more complex, and
certainly different type of federal-state relationship in the design and delivery
of welfare programs.
II. TIEBOUT'S MODEL AND JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION
Charles Tiebout's theory of jurisdictional competition provides a model
for the way in which public goods are efficiently produced by various local
public entities or local governments. 2 1 Tiebout developed this jurisdictional

19 Professor Steinzor has thoughtfully and forcefully made a similar argument in
crafting "sorting principles" for federal-state relationships in the context of environmental
regulation. See Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New (New)
Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REv. 97 (1996).
20 See ROBERT E. GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE

WELFARE STATE 27-118 (1988) (describing and critiquing justifications for welfare based on
need, equality, and community). There are, of course, many other justifications for public
welfare and redistributional programs, or even "theories of justice" more generally. It is not
my goal to survey these here, except to note that from each of these we are likely to derive
unique insights into the optimal allocation of responsibilities for welfare programs between
federal and state governments. That we have not included these as considerations in the
devolution debate-and that that omission has resulted in a myopic debate-is exactly the
point here.
21 Tiebout, supra note 14, at 418.
HeinOnline -- 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 316 2005
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competition model in response to a problem identified by Paul Samuelson 22 and
Richard Musgrave, 23 among others, that no market solution existed to
determine an efficient level of expenditures on public goods when there is only
one supplier of those goods, as in the case of the federal government. In other
words, Samuelson and Musgrave concluded that public goods cannot be
allocated with market efficiency in the absence of competition among multiple
suppliers (or multiple public entities). This inefficiency manifests itself on both
the supply side and the demand side. On the supply side, the lack of market
competition results in overstated costs of public goods-the government pays
too much for the services it provides. On the demand side, consumerscitizens--cannot accurately register their preferences for public goods in terms
of the costs of public goods, because the costs are always overstated. Professors
Bratton and McCahery summarize the Samuelson-Musgrave problem thus:
According to the "Samuelson condition," public goods are allocated
efficiently when the sum of a citizen's marginal rate of substitution of
income for the good equals the marginal cost of an additional unit of the
good. The Samuelson condition, however, is not easily met. With private
goods, market competition exerts downward pressure on producers'
marginal costs, and market prices provide concrete information about
consumers' rates of substitution. With public goods, in contrast, no
obvious market exerts downward pressure on government producers'
marginal costs. Nor does an obvious mechanism force taxpaying
citizen24
consumers truthfully to reveal their rates of substitution.
As a result, according to Samuelson and Musgrave, the allocation of public
goods is necessarily inefficient in the absence of market pressures. In the case
of the federal government supplying uniquely federal goods, therefore, those
goods cannot be provided with market efficiency.
Tiebout responded to this conclusion by examining the allocation of public
goods on the local, not federal, level. He created a model in which multiple
local governments compete as suppliers for taxpaying citizens in the market for
local public goods. According to this model, each local government offers a
unique tax-benefit package, and citizens "shop" for a jurisdiction that best
matches their tax-benefit preferences. On the supply side, local governments
compete to respond to citizen demand in the marketplace, exerting downward
pressure on the marginal costs of public goods. On the demand side, fully
informed and mobile citizens "vote with their feet" 25 and migrate to the

22 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT.

387 (1954).

23 Richard Abel Musgrave, The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy, 53
Q. J. ECON. 213 (1939).
24 Bratton & McCahery, supra note 18, at 207 (footnotes omitted).
25 Tiebout does not use this term, but his theory does emphasize the importanceindeed, the centrality-of mobility in establishing a market for public goods:
Just as the consumer may be visualized as walking to a private market place to buy his
goods, the prices of which are set, we place him in the position of walking to a
community where the prices (taxes) of community services are set. Both trips take the
consumer to market. There is no way in which the consumer can avoid revealing his
HeinOnline -- 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 317 2005
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jurisdiction that provides their desired public goods at a tax rate equal to (or
less than) their marginal rate of substitution of income for the goods. 26 Indeed,
according to Tiebout, "[t]he act of moving or failing to move is crucial.
Moving or failing to move replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy a
good and reveals the consumer-voter's demand for public goods." 27 According
to the model, then, the equilibrium level of taxes and public goods that results
in each jurisdiction will exactly match citizen preferences in each jurisdiction,
28
achieving a market equilibrium in the provision of local public goods.
Tiebout, in perhaps "one of the most-quoted paragraphs from one of the
most-cited articles in urban politics[,] ''29 summarized this theory as follows:
The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which
best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods. . . . At the central
level the preferences of the consumer-voter are given, and the
government tries to adjust to the pattern of these preferences, whereas at
the local level various governments have their revenue and expenditure
patterns more or less set. Given these revenue and expenditure patterns,
the consumer-voter moves to that 30community whose local government
best satisfies his set of preferences.
Tiebout's singular contribution was thus to create this market mechanism
for the provision of local public goods, which ensures efficiency in the market
31
for local public goods and overcomes the Samuelson-Musgrave problem.
The model, of course, relies on several key assumptions:
1. Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will move to that community
where their preference patterns, which are set, are best satisfied.
2. Consumer-voters are assumed to have full knowledge of differences
among revenue and expenditure patterns and to react to these differences.
3. There are a large number of communities in which the consumervoters may choose to live.
4. Restrictions due to employment opportunities are not considered. It
may be assumed that all persons are living on dividend income.
5. The public services supplied exhibit no external economies or
diseconomies between communities.

preferences in a spatial economy. Spatial mobility provides the local public-goods
counterpart to the private market's shopping trip.
Tiebout, supra note 14, at 422.
26 id.
27 Id. at 420.
28 Id.

29 Keith Dowding et al., Tiebout: A Survey of the EmpiricalLiterature, 31 URB. STUD.
767, 767 (1994).
30 Tiebout, supra note 14, at 418 (footnote omitted).
31 Samuelson, supra note 22, at 387-88.
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6. For every pattern of community services ... there is an optimal
community size....
7 ...
[C]ommunities below the optimum size seek to attract new
residents to lower average costs. Those above the optimum size do just
Those at an optimum try to keep their populations
the opposite.
32
constant.
Three policy implications flow from this model. First, integration across
jurisdictions "is justified [on economic welfare grounds] only if more of any
service is forthcoming at the sametotal cost and without reduction of any other
service." 33 Although Tiebout is not specific about this, we would expect the
reverse to hold, as well-that is, disintegration of services and devolution to
various sub-jurisdictions also is justified on economic welfare grounds only if
services increase or remain constant at the same total cost and without
reduction of any other service. Tiebout offers a helpful example of police
services-specifically, municipal versus local police-but, under the model,
this principle applies to any public service.
Second, policies that promote citizen mobility and dissemination of
information-i.e., policies that advance a community toward the ideal of the
mobility assumption and the knowledge assumption-enhance the economic
efficiency in the allocation of public goods. 3 4 Although Tiebout is not specific
about this, we would expect, similarly, that policies that advance communities
toward the ideal encompassed in any of the assumptions, ceterisparibus, would
enhance the efficient allocation of public goods.
Finally, larger and dynamic communities may not be able to maintain a
fixed revenue-expenditure pattern, as the model contemplates. 35 Tiebout poses
this issue as a normative one and fails to provide any extensive thoughts on it,
but the implications are important for our purposes here.
Tiebout recognized some of the potential limitations of this model and
qualified it accordingly. For example, Tiebout recognized that the economies
assumption may not always hold, and that integration across local public
entities may enhance the efficient allocation of public goods where
disintegration results in diseconomies of scale (or where integration may create
economies of scale). 36 If two communities-especially contiguous
communities-can avoid diseconomies of scale (or can achieve economies of
scale) by coordinating their public services in some way, they ought to do so.
Tiebout also recognized that the mobility assumption and the knowledge

32 Tiebout, supra note 14, at 419. For shorthand, I will refer to the first assumption as

the "mobility assumption," the second assumption as the "knowledge assumption," the
fourth assumption as the "employment assumption," the fifth assumption as the "economies
assumption," and the sixth assumption as the "optimum size assumption."
13 Id. at 423.
34 Id.

35 Id.
36 Id.
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assumption may not hold in the real world, and 37
that we do not fully understand
how people make decisions about where to live.
Tiebout's economic model helped spawn the development of the neoTieboutian theory of "jurisdictional competition." The jurisdictional
competition theory states that local jurisdictions-or states, as this theory
seems to arise most often in the context of federalism debates, in which the
central issue is state versus federal authority-actively compete with each other
to retain and attract desirable, taxpaying citizens in the market for public goods.
For most public goods, this competition has been described as a "race to the
top" among jurisdictions, as governments offer increasingly appealing
packages of taxes and services to attract immigrants from other jurisdictions
and to discourage the emigration of their own citizens. In a federalist system of
government, in order to promote this competition among states and local
jurisdictions-and thus to promote the economic efficiencies and optimal tax
and service packages promised by the Tiebout model-the argument goes, we
should devolve programs to the state and local level, granting these
jurisdictions the flexibility and authority to compete, experiment, and respond
to the needs of their citizens.
But for some public goods-most notably environmental regulation and
social welfare programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) and food stamps-the competition has been described as a "race to the
bottom," in which each jurisdiction competes to minimize the public good in
order to attract certain citizens and repel others. In the much discussed case of
environmental regulation, the jurisdictional competition theory predicts that
states will compete for desirable businesses at the expense of environmental
protection, and thus race to the bottom in the provision of environmental
regulation. In the case of social welfare programs, the theory predicts that states
will compete to repel economically, socially, and politically undesirable poor
citizens by cutting relatively generous social welfare programs. States that
provide relatively generous benefits, on the other hand, will encourage
opportunistic welfare migration and become "welfare magnets" for the
undesirable poor. The theory predicts that states will thus race to the bottom in
the provision of social welfare benefits and programs, reducing those
programs
38
to a bare minimum or, in the extreme, eliminating them altogether.
37 Id.
38 At the most simple level, consider, for example, two jurisdictions, each with

authority to tax and spend, each with an equal number of poor citizens, and each otherwise
satisfying the Tiebout assumptions. Assume that jurisdiction A allocates an aggregate budget
of $100 to its welfare program, while jurisdiction B allocates only $50, so that jurisdiction A
provides twice the per capita welfare benefit to its poor citizens. According to the Tiebout
hypothesis, we (and jurisdictions A and B) would expect welfare recipients to migrate from
jurisdiction B to jurisdiction A until the per capita benefit in each jurisdiction is equal, i.e.,
until jurisdiction A has twice as many welfare recipients as jurisdiction B. In order to
preempt this expected migration (or any expected migration) and the resulting drain on its
resources, jurisdiction A will cut its welfare allocation to remove any incentive to migrate.
Thus, jurisdiction A will reduce its welfare allocation to $50, so that its per capita spending
is equal to jurisdiction B. (The jurisdictions may continue to reduce their welfare allocations
in a competition to encourage the emigration of their own poor citizens.) The jurisdictions
will continue to react to each other in a "race to the bottom" until they reach an equilibrium
HeinOnline -- 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 320 2005
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In contemporary federalism debates, we increasingly hear the rhetoric of
the neo-Tieboutian jurisdictional competition theory to justify or oppose
devolution of authority from the federal government to the states. Proponents
of devolution thus employ concepts and arguments related to local flexibility,
experimentation, and competition among jurisdictions in the market for public
goods. Market-like efficiency in the provision of public goods, they say, can
only come through local competition, and competition can only be achieved by
providing states increased flexibility and the ability to experiment-i.e., the
ability to craft their own unique tax-benefit packages to retain and attract

level of welfare spending in both jurisdictions of $50 (or less, if the jurisdictions continue to
compete to encourage welfare emigration). This equilibrium represents (at most) the lowest
level of welfare spending between the jurisdictions.
Alternatively, consider the same two jurisdictions, but assume that jurisdiction A
provides recipients with $100 per month for the first three years and $50 per month for the
next two years. Jurisdiction B, in contrast, provides each recipient with $75 per month for
five years. According to the Tiebout hypothesis, we (and jurisdictions A and B) would
expect a rational welfare recipient may choose to reside in jurisdiction A for three years and
then to move to jurisdiction B for two years in order to maximize benefits between the two
jurisdictions. In order to preempt the anticipated migration, jurisdiction B will reduce its
benefits during the final two years of eligibility to $50. In response, jurisdiction A will
reduce its own benefits during the first three years to $75 in order to prevent migration
during those years. (The jurisdictions may continue to reduce their welfare benefits in a
competition to encourage the emigration of their own poor citizens.) At the close of this
"race to the bottom," the resulting equilibrium level of welfare benefits in both jurisdictions
will be $75 for the first three years and $50 for the final three years (or less, if the
jurisdictions continue to compete to encourage welfare emigration). Just like the equilibrium
in the first example, the equilibrium in this example is, at most, the lowest level of benefits
offered by each jurisdiction at the beginning of the competition.
We may observe these phenomena outside the arena of cash benefits, as well. For
example, we can easily imagine that states might similarly race to the bottom by
implementing more stringent requirements for program participation (e.g., more stringent
work requirements or collateral program requirements) or more challenging administrative
hurdles to gaining or retaining benefits-e.g., application requirements, reporting
requirements, etc.
For a more sophisticated, mathematical model of the race to the bottom, see JAN K.
BRUECKNER, WELFARE REFORM AND INTERSTATE WELFARE COMPETITION: THEORY AND

EVIDENCE 7-12 (Urban Inst., Occasional Paper No. 21, 1998), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm
?ID=307786.
39 Neo-Tieboutian rhetoric is not limited to the welfare devolution debate. For example,
commenting on broader federalism debates, outside the welfare arena, Professor Pettys wrote
the following:
In their quest to comprehend federalism, jurists have devoted considerable attention to
the benefits that may be achieved when state and local governments compete with one
another for a mobile citizenry. Prompted in part by Charles Tiebout's famous 1956
article, many have wedded themselves to the view that horizontal competition among
states and localities helps to ensure that citizens will have an array of governmental
options from which to choose and that governments will have a market-like incentive to
satisfy citizens' demands in increasingly efficient ways. This argument finds a close
cousin in the frequent observation that states and localities serve as laboratories for
testing social and economic programs.
Todd E. Pettys, Competingfor the People'sAffection: Federalism'sForgotten Marketplace,
56 VAND. L. REv. 329, 331-32 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
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citizens that are desirable to them. In our federal system, this means devolution
of authority to the states.
Similarly, opponents of devolution use concepts and arguments related to
the "race to the bottom" and "welfare magnets," implying that jurisdictional
competition results in an artificial decrease in certain public goods, as states
and local jurisdictions compete to attract desirable citizens (such as
corporations, in the case of environmental regulation goods) and to repel
undesirable others (such as the poor, in the case of social welfare benefits). To
opponents, only integration of goods at the federal level (in the form of federal
standards or federal entitlements, for example) will ensure that states do not
reduce certain public goods to an unsustainably low level as a result of this
competition among jurisdictions. In our federal system, this means the retention
of standards and authority at the federal level.
But while these apparently polar positions result in two different
conclusions about the merits of devolution, they derive from the same neoTieboutian jurisdictional competition theory and its assumptions. The next
section explores these positions in the context of the federalism debate over
welfare reform.

III. NEO-TIEBOUTIAN RHETORIC IN THE DEBATE ON WELFARE
REFORM
For much of the recent history of our social welfare system, federal-state
relationships in the delivery of social welfare programs are best described in
terms of some form of cooperative federalism. For our purposes, there are three
hallmarks of this arrangement. First, the federal government sets certain
standards for the states-rules with which states must comply in providing
benefits to families-and entitlements for recipients.40 The regulations focus on
who qualifies for benefits, based largely on income, and the technical
parameters within which states must work to provide those benefits. The
regulations act to protect recipients and ensure their federal entitlement within
the state program. Second, funding is based on a shared formula in which the
level of federal funding is a function of individual state need. The federal share
of the total formula is a multiple of state expenditures, thus providing an
incentive for states to spend more, not less, on their programs. Finally, states
have some flexibility to tailor certain limited elements of their programs, such
as individual standards of need for recipients. This flexibility derives from the
reality that standards of need may vary from location to location, and that states
are in a better position than the federal government to assess needs.
This form of cooperative federalism came to an end-in the Aid to
Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) program, at least-in 1996, when

40 See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand. The Rise of the Personal Choice
Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 819-20 (2004) (stating that the
period between the 1960s and 1995 was a "legalistic era" in public benefits law, the guiding
principle of which was "constraining discretion through uniform [federal] rules").
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Congress enacted the PRWORA. 4 1 The PRWORA replaced cooperative
federalism with devolution, and three hallmarks that correspond to the
hallmarks of cooperative federalism. First, the PRWORA changed the nature of
federal standards from a focus on benefits to a focus on work. The PRWORA
thus regulates the nature of recipients' work and states' work participation rates
and eliminates federal protections for the receipt of benefits, including the
individual entitlement for benefits. Second, the PRWORA changed the funding
mechanism by replacing the cooperative funding formula, which encourages
states to increase funding, to a fixed block-grant, which encourages states to
decrease funding. Finally, the PRWORA provides states with greater flexibility
to tailor their own individual programs within the parameters of the very broad
goals of the PRWORA and the more specific federal work participation rates.
The shift from cooperative federalism to devolution in the AFDC and
TANF programs-and in welfare programs more generally, such as Food
Stamps and Medicaid-is ensconced in a public discourse that draws almost
exclusively on neo-Tieboutian rhetoric and the language of interstate
jurisdictional competition, particularly as they relate to Tiebout's mobility
assumption. Indeed, it is difficult to find rhetoric, arguments, or analysis in the
public record of the devolution debate that is rooted in anything but the
mobility assumption within the neo-Tieboutian lexicon. The pro-devolution
side of the debate is framed in terms of "flexibility," "experimentation,"
"responsiveness to local (state) needs," and "race to the top," while the antidevolution side of the debate is framed in terms of "welfare magnets" and "race
to the bottom."
This section traces this rhetoric through the welfare devolution debates,
discourse, and analyses in academia, policy institutions, and the press, and the
devolution debates in Congress, the states, and the courts. It is worth reminding
the reader that "welfare devolution debates" or "devolution debates" as used
here do not refer exclusively to the devolution debates surrounding the original
PRWORA; rather, I use those terms to include the devolution debates with
respect to AFDC/TANF, Food Stamps, and Medicaid in the original welfare
reform bills, with respect to these programs in the reauthorization legislation,
and with respect to welfare programs generally.
An analysis by Professors Buckley and Brinig well represents the rhetoric
on the pro-devolution side of the debate in academia:
Many of the standard arguments for assigning powers to the state level
apply in the case of welfare responsibilities. Devolution of welfare
powers usefully reduces information costs, promotes experimentation,
and permits people to sort themselves out by policy preferences through
migration.... Had there been a race to the bottom, states would have
reacted to increased welfare
42 pressure with welfare cuts. We find no
evidence that this happened.
41 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
42 F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top, 5 Sup.
CT. ECON. REv. 141, 142-44 (1997).
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The anti-devolution side of the debate in academia has featured perhaps
even stronger neo-Tieboutian rhetoric and analysis. This side of the debate
seems to recognize some of the benefits of local flexibility in welfare delivery
systems, but it is concerned about a race to the bottom among independently
operating states, based on jurisdictional competition assumptions, most notably
the mobility assumption. This side of the debate, therefore, tends to focus on

the phenomenon of opportunistic welfare migration.
Paul Peterson is an eloquent and thoughtful leader on this side of the
43
debate. In The Price ofFederalism, Peterson predicts a race to the bottom and
welfare magnets" based on data that indicate that after 1969 the poor
considered welfare benefits in making residential choices-i.e., that
opportunistic welfare migration exists-and that states actively and rationally
45
adjust their welfare programs to avoid an influx of the poor. Peterson and
Marc C. Rom's book, Welfare Magnets: A New Casefor a National Standard,

is devoted almost entirely to issues of opportunistic welfare mi 6ration and, as
the title suggests, the magnetic effects of state welfare programs.
David Ellwood of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University testified before the Senate Finance Committee in 1996 on welfare
reform:
I am fearful that the current round of reform proposals are more likely to
simply reduce benefits and cut people off than move people from welfare
to work. The danger of a race to the bottom is very real.... Some states

43

PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 126 (1995).

44 Id. at 123.
45 Id. The journal Publius ran an excellent series of articles on welfare devolution in its

Summer 1998 edition. These articles invariably turn to neo-Tieboutian language and
analyses in examining issues of welfare devolution. See Richard M. Francis, Predictions,
Patterns, and Policymaking: A Regional Study of Devolution, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at
143 (examining the response of state officials under welfare devolution, in light of the
opposing forecasts of "race to the bottom" and local support for the poor); Samuel H. Beer,
Welfare Reform: Revolution or Retrenchment?, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 9, 12 ("If there is
a race to the bottom, that surely spells retrenchment. The possibility is inherent in the United
States federal system. Thanks to its dispersion of authority among the states, American
federalism gives rise to that familiar problem of collective action in which competition
among separate actors tempts them individually to do what they otherwise prefer not to
do."); Scott W. Allard, Revisiting Shapiro: Welfare Magnets and State Residency
Requirements in the 1990s, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 45 (reviewing the evidence on
opportunistic welfare migration in the context of welfare residency requirements); Sanford F.
Schram & Joe Soss, Making Something Out of Nothing: Welfare Reform and a New Race to
the Bottom, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 67 (critically examining the "laboratories of
democracy," "welfare magnet," and "race to the bottom" theses); Irene Lurie, Watching the
Race: Where You Sit Affects What You See, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 89 (questioning the
"race to the bottom" and "welfare magnet" theses); Jocelyn M. Johnston & Kara Lindaman,
Implementing Welfare Reform in Kansas: Moving, But Not Racing, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998,
at 123 (examining the "race to the bottom" theses in the context of Kansas's welfare
program); Mark Carl Rom, et al., Interstate Competition and Welfare Policy, PUBLIUS,
Summer 1998, at 17 (examining welfare devolution and interstate competition).
46

PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR A

NATIONAL STANDARD (1990). But see Sanford F. Schram et al., Without Cause or Effect:
Reconsidering Welfare Migration as a Policy Problem, 42 AM. J. POL. Sci. 210 (1998).
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may find it much easier to move people from welfare to the state border
47
than from welfare to work. And so the race to the bottom may begin.

Other empirical and policy analyses have been less conclusive, but they
nevertheless are couched in neo-Tieboutian terms, examining neo-Tieboutian
assumptions. 48 A variety of empirical studies from academics and policy thinkin welfare programs 49
tanks have examined interstate jurisdictional competition
5°
and, particularly, opportunistic welfare migration.
In the law and policy literature, commentators have similarly conformed
their analyses of welfare devolution to the neo-Tieboutian lexicon. For
example, one commentator concluded firmly that welfare devolution would
result in a race to the bottom. 5 1 Another concluded that opportunistic welfare
migration is more myth than reality, 52 but that states nevertheless react to
changing poverty rates-even if not driven by opportunistic welfare

47 Welfare and Medicaid Reform: Hearing on S. 1795 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 104th Cong. 114-15 (1996) (statement of David T. Ellwood, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University); see also R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE
AS WE KNOW IT 27-28 (2000).

State discretion in administering the program may also lead to competition among
states to keep benefits low to avoid becoming a 'welfare magnet,' attracting
'undesirable' beneficiaries from other states. In fact, a race to the bottom may
occur even if welfare magnet effects are weak as long as politicians believe that
they are real.
Id. (citing PETERSON & ROM, supra note 46).
48 For a more general overview of empirical studies of Tieboutian phenomenon, see
Dowding et al., supra note 29.
49 See, e.g., BRUECKNER, supra note 38; ELIZABETH T. POWERS, BLOCK GRANTING
WELFARE: FISCAL IMPACT ON THE STATES (Urban Inst., Occasional Paper No. 23, 1999),
http://www.urban.org/ElizabethTPowers; JAN K. BRUECKNER, WELFARE REFORM AND THE

RACE TO THE BOTTOM: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (Inst. Gov't & Pub. Aff., Working Paper No.
64, 1998), http://www.igpa.uiuc.edu/publications/workingPapers.htm; David N. Figlio et al.,
Do States Play Welfare Games?, 46 J. URB. ECON. 437 (1999); Luz AMPARO SAAVEDRA, A
MODEL OF WELFARE COMPETITION WITH EVIDENCE FROM AFDC (Inst. Gov't & Pub. Aff.,
Working Paper No. 63, 1998), http://www.igpa.uiuc.edu/publications/workingPapers.htm;
JAMES FOSSETT & THOMAS GAIS, A NEW PUZZLE FOR FEDERALISM: DIFFERENT STATE
RESPONSES TO MEDICAID AND FOOD STAMPS (2002), http://www.rockinst.org/publications/

welfare-and-jobs.html.
50 For a good overview of the several empirical studies of neo-Tieboutian assumptions
in the welfare context, see BRUECKNER, supra note 38, at 13-17.

51 See Note, Devolving Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice Perspective,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1984, 1986-87 (1996).
Devolution-in combination with the constitutionalized "right to travel" will
produce economic pressure for states to implement welfare programs that are less
generous than those they would have implemented in the absence of devolution:
"Fearful that they will become a Mecca for the poor if their welfare programs are
more generous than those of their neighbors, states will compete in their
stinginess."
Id. (citations omitted).
52 See generally Shauhin A. Talesh, Note, Welfare Migration to Capture Higher
Benefits: Fact or Fiction?,32 CONN. L. REV. 675, 676, 698 (2000).
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migration-in designing welfare programs.53 Yet other commentators have
used neo-Tieboutian rhetoric
54 to describe and analyze particular aspects of the
welfare devolution debate.
Similar themes echo in the popular press. Robert Reischauer, in The
Washington Post, outlined the two sides of the debate nicely:
To the states, block grants hold out the promise of reduced federal
regulation and a chance to use Washington's money to pay for statedesigned programs that may be better tailored to local values and
conditions.... [But] [f]earful that they will become a Mecca for the poor
than those of their neighbors,
if their welfare programs are more generous
55
states will compete in their stinginess.
A 2004 editorial by the Chicago Tribune editorial board is typical of the
rhetoric on the pro-devolution side of the debate:
Welfare reform has been successful precisely because it recognized
that the federal government should get the heck out of the way and let
states figure out how best to end the culture of welfare dependency.
The law set limits on how long families could receive welfare. But it
also gave chunks of money to the states and broad discretion over how to
prepare people for the world of work.
And so, 50 experiments were born.

Flexibility has been the hallmark of welfare reform. States are
perfectly capable of learning from each others' successes-and failures-

53 Id. at 698 ("'In other words, states may in fact be influenced by changing poverty
rates in deciding benefit levels, even if there is not much welfare migration in or out of the
state."') (quoting Schram, supra note 46, at 215; analyzing Peterson and Rom's work).
54 See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis & Cheryl M. Miller, Welfare Waiting Periods:A Public Policy
Analysis of Saenz v. Roe, 11 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 343, 344 (2000) (describing durational
residency requirements under state welfare reform programs as efforts to diminish
opportunistic welfare migration); Joshua D. Samoff, Cooperative Federalism, the
Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARiZ. L. REv. 205, 210 (1997)
("Congress delegates power to the states, moreover, in order to satisfy preferences for statelevel regulation and for state citizens' values.") (citing Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the
Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the
Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 76 (1990)); Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare:
How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privitization Subverted Federal Welfare
Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 573, 583 (2004) ("Advocates for greater states' rights

and/or greater privatization gained considerable momentum at the same time these welfare
critics were demanding substantive reform. These 'smaller government' advocates
championed wholesale devolution and deregulation in the name of greater democracy,
authenticity, choice, and efficiency .... ).
55 Robert D. Reischauer, The Blockbuster Inside the Republicans' Budget; In the Rush
to Fiscal Devolution, Has Anyone Figured Out How to Divvy Up the Cash?, WASH. POST,
May 14, 1995, at C2; see also David S. Broder, Race to the Bottom?, WASH. POST, Aug. 6,

1995, at C9 ("Welfare programs could be tailored more easily to local circumstances [with
devolution] .... The critics' fear is that instead of innovating, the states will engage in a
'race to the bottom' that shreds the social safety net.").
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thank you.56
Syndicated columnist Matthew Miller well represents the rhetoric on the
anti-devolution side of the debate-a rhetoric that amounts to the neoTieboutian mirror image of the pro-devolution rhetoric. "Without [a federal
matching fund] incentive, states will unleash a competitive frenzy of benefit
cuts, fueled by their understandable desire to be stingier than their neighbors to
avoid attracting new dependants. Federal standards and dollars assure the
neediest won't be sacrificed in such a 'race to the bottom."' 5 7
Because the devolution debate in academia, policy think-tanks, and the
popular press is so firmly rooted in neo-Tieboutian rhetoric, it should come as
no surprise that the rhetoric of Congress and other policy makers in the
devolution debate is similarly-but perhaps even more myopically-neoTieboutian in nature. The following statements by members of the House
Commerce Committee during testimony on welfare reform in 1996 well
represent the polar positions in the devolution debate on Medicaid:
Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY): The state of New York has been very generous
in terms of health care....
It's kind of what I like to call a race to the bottom, because many
residents who live in States who don't cover them will go to States that
do cover them, burdening States like New York even further.
Rep. Scott L. Klug (R-WI) [question to a witness]: And rather than
seeing this as a race to the bottom, would it be your argument that what
you see is giving states better flexibility to have a race to the top, that
essentially, Wisconsin, Michigan, Virginia, Florida, could create
programs that are much more effective
58 and much cheaper to operate than
what the Federal Government does?

56 Editorial, Will Congress Kill Welfare Reform?, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 2004, at C10; see

also Douglas J. Besharov, There's More Welfare to Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at
A 15 (arguing for greater flexibility for the states in meeting certain work participation rates);
Editorial, Race to the Top, WALL ST.J., April 2, 2004, at A8.
57 Matthew Miller, Editorial, States Would Shred the Safety Net, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, March 10, 1996, at 58A.
58The Personal Responsibilty and Work Opportunity Act of 1996: Hearing on H.R.
3507 Before the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 87-89 (1996); see also President
William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President on Welfare Reform at the White House (Aug.
4, 1998), http://clinton4.nara.gov/WHiNew/html/19980804-4271.html ("Two years ago we
said welfare reform would spark a race to independence, not a race to the bottom, and this
prediction is coming true.").
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State flexibility was a key component of the original PRWORA, 59 and the

rhetoric in Congress and the states reflected that. But in the wake of the
PRWORA-as Congress evaluates welfare devolution and debates
reauthorization-neo-Tieboutian rhetoric often reads like an homage to the

virtues of state flexibility, or even a competition to create the most flexible
program. 60 Then-Governor Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin testified before
the House Committee on Government Reform that states did not use flexibility
to race to the bottom, and that Congress should grant states even more

flexibility in meeting Maintenance of Effort requirements and in other areas,
such as health care and education. 61 Representative Howard P. McKeon argued
on the House floor in support of "super-waiver" authority under the Senate's
reauthorization bill that increased flexibility will allow states "to better
coordinate" welfare programs and "will encourage states to continue the

experimentation at the state and local level that preceded the federal welfare
reform action in 1996. "62 Even the General Accounting Office, in its testimony
before a House committee, couched its supportive statements in terms of neo-

Tieboutian language
of "state flexibility," experimentation, and interstate
63
competition.

The National Governors Association (NGA) asserted its continued support
for devolution of welfare because "[t]he TANF block grant has provided
Governors the flexibility to implement innovative welfare reform programs

based on work requirements and time limits, along with the ability to use
TANF funds to provide needed work supports for low-income working

", See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, at 262 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2649, 2650.
Power and Flexibility to the States. The best welfare solutions come from those closest
to the problems-not from bureaucrats in Washington. The legislation creates broad
cash welfare and child care block grants providing maximum flexibility so that States
can reform welfare in ways that are appropriate to them, and can move families into
jobs.
Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 1-6 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,
2183-87 (describing the benefits of increased state flexibility, especially over waivers,
because waivers "cannot substitute for fundamental, systemic changes that empower States
and local communities to make their own decisions about how to address the needs of their
populations.... Thus, welfare recipients are denied the full benefit of the innovations that
States are seeking to initiate.").
60 See generally 148 CONG. REC. H2517 (May 16, 2002) (Debate on the Personal
Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2002) (reflecting debate on whether
welfare reform reauthorization proposals offer enough flexibility to the states).
61 NationalProblems, Local Solutions: Federalismat Work PartIII, Welfare Reform is
Working: A Report on State and Local Initiatives: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Gov't Reform, 106th Cong. 23 (1999) (statement of Tommy G. Thompson, Governor of
Wisconsin).
62 149 CONG. REc. E188, E189 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2003) (statement of Rep. McKeon).
63 Implementation of Welfare Reform Work Requirements and Time Limits: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong.
6-69 (2002) (statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Director, Education, Workforce,
and Income Security Issues of the General Accounting Office); U.S. GAO, WELFARE
REFORM:

OUTCOMES

FOR

TANF

RECIPIENTS

WITH

IMPAIRMENTS

(July

2002),

http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/date.php (Report to Congressional Register; GAO-02-884).
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families." 64 The NGA has argued for additional flexibility in a variety of areas
when Congress reauthorizes the PRWORA.6 5
The opposition to welfare devolution is more muted in Congress, but,
again, it is framed in neo-Tieboutian rhetoric. In arguing against unfettered
devolution of Medicaid in 1995, Senator Graham used a neo-Tieboutian
argument to support a proposal for a per capita cap approach to protect
vulnerable Medicaid recipients from a race to the bottom in the Medicaid
program. 66 In commenting on welfare devolution in the wake of President
Clinton's veto of earlier welfare-reform legislation, Senator Moynihan made
his position on welfare devolution via a block grant clear:
First, it is widely assumed that AFDC is a Federal entitlement that the
Federal Government can restrain without relinquishing. It is not. There is
no Federal entitlement to welfare for individuals. Each State devises its
own program. The Federal Government provides a matching grant.
Abolish67the matching grant and you can reasonably expect a race to the
bottom.

Thus, both sides of the debate about the form of federal-state relationships
captured in the PRWORA framed their rhetoric around state experimentation
and interstate competition, although they come down with very different
conclusions. Supporters of the PRWORA argued that devolution Would permit
states to "experiment" to respond to local needs, desires, and conditions, and to
compete with each other to provide an optimal level of benefits. And opponents
of the PRWORA argued that devolution would result in a "race to the bottom"
among states, who would design welfare policies that would drive away their
own poor and discourage opportunistic welfare migration from other states.
This polarized debate about jurisdictional competition-and specifically
about the mobility assumption, or opportunistic welfare migration-apparently
led Congress to erect a kind of migration barrier in the PRWORA by
permitting-but, notably, not requiring-states to provide immigrants from
other states only the (lower) level of benefit that they would have received in
their former state of residence for a period not to exceed 12 months. 68 The

64 NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, POLICY POSITION HHS-21, WELFARE REFORM POLICY

21.1, http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1 169,C.POLICYPOSITIONAD_554,00.
html (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
65

Id., pt. 21.3.2.

66 141 CONG. REc. S16845, S16847 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Graham) ("Per capita cap legislation is our way out of the race to the bottom and is our ticket
to a 21 st century that maintains an American Federal-State stake in the health and welfare of
its citizens.").
67 142 CONG. REc. 498, 499 (1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
6 42 U.S.C. § 604(c) (2000) (stating that states "may apply to a family the rules
(including benefit amounts) of the program funded under this part of another State if the
family has moved to the State from the other State and has resided in the State for less than
12 months").
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welfare migration 69
purpose of this provision was to prevent opportunistic
70
while not running afoul of Shapiro v. Thompson.
Several state legislatures, evidently concerned about opportunistic welfare
migration as part of their enactments of relatively generous welfare packages
under their welfare reform plans, 71 took up proposals to erect the migration
barrier permitted under § 604(c) as part of their new plans. 72 Debates about
these initiatives were consistently framed in the neo-Tieboutian rhetoric of state
experimentation, interstate jurisdictional competition, and, specifically,
opportunistic welfare migration. California provides a good, representative case
study, because its migration barrier was in many ways archetypal and because
it became the subject of Saenz v. Roe,73 discussed below.
California's migration barrier read as follows:
Notwithstanding the maximum aid payments specified in paragraph (1)
of subdivision (a) of section 11450, families that have resided in this state
for less than 12 months shall be paid an amount calculated in accordance
with paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of section 11450, not to exceed the
maximum aid payment that would
have been received by that family
74
from the state of prior residence.
California originally sought to implement this statute in 1992, before the
enactment of the PRWORA, as a waiver under its AFDC program. 75 Its
implementation was enjoined, however, because it was held unconstitutional by
a state court. 76 The Supreme Court later vacated
the case as non-ripe, because
77
the waiver was under review in a separate case.

69 H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 1339 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.CC.A.N. 2183, 2187.
7' 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that state welfare statutes imposing a one-year

residency requirement prior to awarding benefits under the AFDC program violate the Equal
Protection Clause).
71 Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 520 n.14 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citing and quoting
legislative history of the California statute).
72 Brief of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (No. 98-97).
Subsequently, in the wake of the PRWORA, California implemented the provision. The
courts again held it to be unconstitutional. Roe v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Cal.
1997), affd, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998), affd sub nom. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999).
At the time of the Saenz case, 12 states had adopted two-tiered residency requirements,
and seven had been enjoined by the courts.,Brief of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et
al., as Amici Curiae at 14, Saenz (No. 98-97).
" 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
74 CAL. WELF. &INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West 2001).

75 Joint Appendix at 43, 45-49, Saenz (No. 98-97) (California's Proposition 165
Waiver Request (excerpts), Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor, California, to Jo Anne
Barnhart, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (May 19, 1992)).
76 Green, 811 F. Supp. at 516.
77 Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that the appeal to the Supreme
Court was not ripe, because, in parallel litigation, plaintiffs challenged the Secretary's
approval of the waiver). The separate case is Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994).
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In the wake of the PRWORA, however, California implemented this same
provision. 78 The rhetoric surrounding the original proposition and waiver
request and later implementation was couched largely in language deriving
from the mobility assumption. California's original waiver request justified its
"relocation grant" program in terms of "reduc[ing] the incentive for families to
migrate to California for the purpose of obtaining higher aid payments." 79 The
California Legislative Analyst Report on the proposal to create a "two-tier"
system examined the research on opportunistic welfare migration (offering no
solid conclusions for the California program), stating that
[t]wo-tier proposals have surfaced in other states; generally where the
AFDC or [general assistance] grants are high compared to surrounding
states. The concern driving these policy proposals is that people receiving
assistance in low-benefit states are encouraged to move to high-benefit
states in order to take advantage of the higher benefit. In effect, the highbenefit state becomes a so-called "welfare
magnet." Two-tier grants are
8
thought to mitigate migration incentives. 0

Members of the California Assembly-both pro-barrier and anti-barrierduring the floor
liberally used rhetoric derived from the mobility assumption
81
debate to justify positions for and against the measure.
As mentioned above, these migration barrier measures were challenged at
the United States Supreme Court in Saenz v. Roe.82 Although the legal issues in
this case were framed in terms of the right to travel, a consistent theme in the
rhetoric of the parties, amici, and courts revolved around state experimentation
and interstate jurisdictional competition, specifically around the mobility
assumption. For example, in Saenz, the defendant's consistent and stated
83
interest in adopting this policy was to deter opportunistic welfare migration.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03.
79 Joint Appendix at 45, 48, Saenz (No. 98-97).
80 Joint Appendix at 51-52, Saenz (No. 98-97) (Dec. 19, 1991 Legislative Analyst
Report to Assemblymember Quackenbush).
81 Joint Appendix at 63-74, Saenz (No. 98-97) (California Assembly Floor Debate and
78

Vote on SB 366 (Mar. 9, 1992)). For example, Mr. Costa said:
Realizing that in fact funds are short in California today, it makes a great deal of sense
then to insure that incentives are provided for people from other parts of the country, in
fact that who might be lured to California if in fact there is evidence to make that case,
that people might be willing to come here for the purpose-to benefit from higher
assistance. This legislation attempts to take care of that by requiring a one year
residency requirement in California for anyone to benefit from the level of assistance
that we now provide for people who are residents of California.
Id. at 63. On the other side of the debate, Mr. Bates argued: "[Immigrants from other states]
are not coming here for any perceived welfare benefit increases that they somehow or other
could get by coming to California. So we are deceiving ourselves if we think somehow or
other people are coming to California for welfare benefits." Id. at 64.
82 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
83 Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 522 n.14 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citing and quoting
legislative history of the California statute); Roe v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977, 982-83
(E.D. Cal. 1997) (reviewing the parties' evidence on welfare migration and the "welfare
magnet" hypothesis); Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1998) ("At oral
argument before this court, in response to the suggestion that the purpose of § 11450.03 is to
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Amici also used opportunistic welfare migration as the basis for arguments for
and against this provision. 84 The courts consistently held that this interest was
insufficient and thus the state statute was unconstitutional.8 5
Similarly, in Maldonado v. Houstoun,86 the plaintiffs challenged a similar
statute under Pennsylvania law. 87 The plaintiffs argued that a primary purpose
of enacting the law was to deter opportunistic welfare migration. 88 The district
court found that, while this was only a secondary purpose of the law, the statute
was nevertheless unconstitutional.89 The circuit court, too, recognized that

keep poor people out of the state, the state conceded that it does not want people to move to
California 'with a mind-set of economic dependency.').
84 Brief of Social Scientists as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, Saenz (No.
98-97); Brief for William Cohen et al., Amici Curiae, Supporting Respondents at 15-18,
Saenz (No. 98-97); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners in
Part and Respondents in Part at 14-45, Saenz (No. 98-97) (discussing opportunistic welfare
migration and the "welfare magnet" hypothesis, and arguing that 42 U.S.C. § 602(c) was
enacted to help mitigate the effects of opportunistic welfare migration); Brief of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al., as Amici Curiae at 15-18, Saenz (No. 98-97).
85 Green, 811 F. Supp. at 520-22 ("If the purpose of the measure is to deter migration
by poor people into the State, and it appears that this may be the purpose, then the measure
must be unconstitutional.") (footnote omitted); Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506 ("These
classifications may not be justified by a purpose to deter welfare applicants from migrating
to California for three reasons."); Joint Appendix at 50, Saenz (No. 98-97); Joint Appendix
at 63-74, Saenz (No. 98-97) (California Assembly Floor Debate and Vote on SB 366 (Mar.
9, 1992); Joint Appendix at 112, Saenz (No. 98-97) (Declaration of Joel F. Handler); Joint
Appendix at 119, Saenz (No. 98-97) (Declaration of John Hartman).
86 177 F.R.D. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1997), affd, 157 F.3d 179 (3d. Cir. 1998).
87 The Pennsylvania statute at issue read:
Cash assistance for applicants and recipients of aid to families with dependent
children who have resided in this Commonwealth for less than twelve months shall
not exceed the lesser of the maximum assistance payment that would have been
received from the applicant's or recipient's state of prior residence or the
maximum assistance payment available to the applicant or recipient in this
Commonwealth.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432(5)(ii) (West 1996). In addition to section 432(5)(ii), there were
other Pennsylvania statutes that similarly limited the welfare benefits that new Pennsylvania
residents could receive. These other statutes imposed a waiting period on general assistance
benefits, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432.4 (West 1996), and denied medical assistance to
residents who had lived in Pennsylvania less than 90 days. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §
442.1 (a)(1) (West 1996). The state Attorney General directed the state Department of Public
Welfare not to enforce these statutes, finding that they were unconstitutional under
prevailing United States Supreme Court precedent. Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 316 n.2.
88 Plaintiffs' argument rested on scant legislative history, see Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at
329 n.22, and the testimony of Professor John Hartman. Id. at 328 n.20. Just as he testified in
Saenz, Professor Hartman testified that there was no evidence to support the "welfare
magnet" hypothesis. Id. The point here is not that plaintiffs' evidence or arguments were
persuasive (or not), but that the rhetoric of the case-from the parties to the evidence to the
court's decision itself-revolved around jurisdictional competition and opportunistic welfare
migration principles.
89 Id. at 332 (finding that the state's purpose in deterring welfare migration-a
secondary, not primary, purpose of the statute, according to the court-was
unconstitutionally impermissible). The primary purpose of the statute-to encourage
employment, self-respect, and self-dependency among welfare recipients, according to the
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deterring opportunistic welfare migration was one purpose of the statute, and,
in a summary statement, found that purpose "clearly unconstitutional." 90
Thus, the welfare devolution rhetoric, on both sides of the debate, among
academics, columnists, policy makers, and legal advocates is deeply rooted in
neo-Tieboutian language and assumptions. In the next section, I suggest that a
broader debate, including a wider range of Tieboutian and non-Tieboutian
considerations, may yield a richer set of possibilities for welfare federalism.
IV. SORTING PRINCIPLES
The neo-Tieboutian model, with its almost exclusive emphasis on the
mobility assumption, leads to one of two polar conclusions: welfare ought to be
(completely) devolved to the states to promote experimentation and
responsiveness to local needs and desires or welfare ought to be (completely)
federal to prevent "race-to-the-bottom" and "welfare magnet" effects. But these
two positions clearly do not occupy the entire field of possibilities for welfare
federalism-they are merely poles on a uni-dimensional continuum. To realize
the full richness of federalism possibilities, we must diversify the debate and
consider principles outside the narrow mobility assumption to help sort out the
appropriate roles for the federal and state governments in the design and
delivery of welfare programs.
This Part thus seeks to introduce some candidates for diversified sorting
principles in the devolution debate. The Part considers two broad categories of
sorting principles: those that are endogenous to Tiebout's original model and
those that are exogenous to the original model. The former category attempts to
illustrate the paucity of considerations in the current debate even within the
limited world of the Tiebout model. I attempt to show that the neo-Tieboutian
debate, simply by considering other assumptions within the Tiebout model
91
itself, could enrich the array of options for welfare federalism immeasurably.
The latter category attempts to illustrate the even greater paucity of
considerations in the current debate given the universe of options outside the
Tiebout model. These exogenous sorting principles of political participation,
community, and equality and justice seek to fill gaps in the narrow economic
analysis of the Tiebout model and provide an even richer array of welfare
federalism possibilities. The result is an exploration of potential factors to help

court-was not rationally related to the statute, and thus an unconstitutionally impermissible
rationale using rational-basis scrutiny. Id.
90 Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 189 (3d Cir. 1998) ("The district court found
this purpose clearly unconstitutional under Shapiro and its progeny. We agree, and it does
not warrant additional discussion."). The court went on to hold that the other stated purpose
of the statute--"to encourage work and self-sufficiency over dependency"-was also
unconstitutional, under a strict scrutiny test. Id. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
explore the appropriate level of scrutiny applied in "right to travel" cases; the point here is
only that interstate jurisdictional competition language has become an entrenched part of the
rhetoric.
91 That they have not is curious. For example, why does the neo-Tieboutian debate
focus almost exclusively on the mobility assumption, rather than some other assumption
within the model, such as the knowledge assumption?
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sort out the complex and appropriate roles for federal and state governments in
welfare.
This list, then, represents mere candidates for additional federalism sorting
principles. This list is neither necessarily complete nor exhaustive; it simply
represents potential additional considerations in the devolution debate.
Moreover, my analysis of these principles does not necessarily point to any
particular role for the federal or state governments, although it occasionally
does. My intent here is not to provide specific answers, but only to raise
questions. My modest hope is that these sorting principles will spawn new
research, more diverse debate, and richer possibilities for welfare federalism.
A.

Endogenous Sorting Principles

Considering that the devolution debate seems so deeply rooted in
Tiebout's model and its neo-Tieboutian cousin, jurisdictional competition, it is
surprising that the debate fails to consider Tiebout's knowledge assumption and
externalities as sorting principles alongside the mobility assumption. As
discussed below, Tiebout himself seemed to argue that the knowledge
assumption was as critical to his model as the mobility assumption. And
consideration of externalities is a stand-by in federalism debates in other areas
of public policy, most notably the environment. The knowledge assumption and
externalities seem to be critical elements in a consideration of federalism under
Tieboutian assumptions. This section attempts to sketch out the implications of
including them as sorting principles for welfare federalism. Although I draw no
specific conclusions, it is clear that including these considerations in the
devolution debate results in a much richer array of possibilities for welfare
federalism. This section also suggests that the mobility assumption should
remain a principle-but merely one of several-in the devolution debate.
1. The Knowledge Assumption
The omission of considerations relating to the knowledge assumption from
the devolution debate is curious, considering that Tiebout himself seemed to
place it on par with the mobility assumption. Tiebout wrote:
Policies that promote residential mobility and increase the knowledge of
the consumer-voter will improve the allocation of government
expenditures in the same sense that mobility among jobs and knowledge
relevant to the location
of industry and labor improve the allocation of
92
private resources.
The statement reflects a truism: citizens cannot make meaningful
residential decisions based on a comparison of tax-benefit packages among
jurisdictions without knowledge of those tax-benefit packages. Full knowledge
is an important consideration in Tiebout's original model; it is also an
important consideration in any jurisdictional competition or neo-Tieboutian
model; it ought to be a consideration in the devolution debate.
The question from the government's perspective in the devolution debate
is: What level of government is best situated to provide information about
92

Tiebout, supra note 14, at 423.
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welfare programs to citizens and potential citizens? Each individual state
enjoys a comparative advantage in describing and publicizing its own program,
and the states, therefore, may be in a good position to inform the citizenry
within their own state and within other states. But if citizens really vote with
their feet, as both sides of the devolution debate seem to assume, states'
incentives to provide information about their programs depend on their desire
to attract or repel citizens. For example, under neo-Tieboutian assumptions,
states with relatively stingy programs have strong incentives to publicize their
programs: they want to disseminate information about their programs within
their boundaries to repel their own poor and outside their boundaries to
discourage opportunistic welfare migration and to attract nonpoor citizens of
other states. On the other hand, again under neo-Tieboutian assumptions, states
with relatively generous programs have a strong disincentive to publicize their
programs, at least outside their own borders, in order not to encourage
opportunistic welfare migration. -Neo-Tieboutian assumptions may also
encourage some states to publicize their programs inaccurately. Because states
will always offer different welfare packages, there will always be incentives for
states to variously publicize their programs: some will publicize more and
accurately; others will publicize less and inaccurately. It seems, therefore, that
there is a role for a central repository and publisher of information about
various state welfare programs; the federal government is well situated to play
this role.
But there are other reasons, unrelated to jurisdictional competition, for
governments to publicize their welfare programs. For example, publicity allows
governments to better and more clearly articulate and reflect their community
values. 93 Publicity allows governments to share information about various
program approaches and results. And publicity allows citizens to register their
preferences through more traditional forms of democratic participation, such as
voting and advocacy. 94 These benefits to publicity may point in different
directions with regard to welfare federalism; they ought to be a part of the
devolution debate so that we can sort them out.
The question from the citizen and recipient perspective in the debate is
this: What level of government can best promote the capabilities among
citizens and recipients to gain full information about welfare programs? The
question implicates a host of democratic institutions-most notably public
education-designed to promote and enable democratic and economic
capabilities and functionings. It is well beyond the scope of this Article to
consider issues of federalism in institutions such as public education, but the
existing location of these institutions in our federal system may help us better
understand how to sort federal and state responsibilities in promoting
knowledge of welfare programs.
It seems clear that knowledge and publicity are important considerations
for welfare federalism, whether under neo-Tieboutian assumptions or not. The
various reasons for knowledge and publicity may point us in different

13

See infra Part IV.B.2.

94 See infra Part IV.B. 1.
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directions with regard to welfare federalism: some reasons may point toward
state responsibility for publicity and the promotion of capabilities among
citizens to understand the dimensions of welfare programs; others may point in
the direction of federal responsibility. Still other considerations related to
knowledge and publicity may demand an information analog to the federal
migration barrier overruled in Saenz v. Roe-something like a federal
transparency requirement that might require states and local governments to
collect and disseminate particular kinds of information about welfare programs
for the purpose of educating the public. The point is merely that these
considerations may yield a richer array of options for welfare federalism, and
that they ought to be a part of the devolution debate.
2. Externalities
A second curious omission from the devolution debate relates to
externalities. Consideration of externalities is critical in any economic analysis
of federalism, and externalities play a central role in federalism debates in other
areas of public policy, most notably the environment. 95 But the welfare
devolution debate has been largely devoid of considerations of externalities; as
a result, the debate has failed to consider a critical element in sorting out
federal and state responsibilities for welfare programs. Externalities ought to be
a part of the debate.
Externalities in the welfare context are interstate economic effects of
various state welfare programs and mobile welfare recipients. Under a
devolved welfare scheme-and especially under a scheme like the PRWORA,
which emphasizes the economic functions of welfare through -work
requirements-economic effects of welfare programs and welfare recipients
themselves may spill over between jurisdictions. In fact, under jurisdictional
competition assumptions, we expect spill-over in the form of opportunistic
welfare migration. As the PRWORA takes root, we may observe other, even
unanticipated forms of spill-over and externalities in economic harms and
benefits between states. For a variety of reasons, states may lack the
capabilities to internalize these spill-over effects, and, as some environmental
96
to look
scholars
have
argued,
we may need
between
states.to the federal government to
cushion the
impact
of externalities

95 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 23 (1996); Symposium, The Role of Law in Defining SustainableDevelopment,

3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 (1998) (three articles on the topic "Externalities, Technology, and
Sustainable Development"); Terence J. Centner, Concentrated Feeding Operations: An
Examination of Current Regulations and Suggestionsfor Limiting Negative Externalities,25

COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219 (2000); Richard L. Revesz, The Control of Interstate
EnvironmentalExternalitiesin a FederalSystem, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 883 (1996).
96 See Butler & Macey, supra note 95, at 42 ("If nontrivial external costs are imposed
across political boundaries, then the issue should be addressed by a higher level of
government."); Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A

CriticalAnalysis, 24 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 237, 239 (2000) ("[Clentralization can overcome
the problems associated with interjurisdictional negative externalities."); Daniel C. Esty,
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,95 MIcH. L. REv. 570, 626 (1996) ("The presence of
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The federal migration barrier at issue in Saenz v. Roe seems an implicit
recognition of this point: the migration barrier was designed to prevent
prophylactically a spill-over in welfare recipients. 97 Under Saenz, of course,
there is no longer a federal prophylactic measure to deal with externalities. The
devolution debate ought, therefore, to consider other remedial and
compensatory roles for the federal government in cushioning the effects of
externalities between states.
It is unclear what role externalities play in devolved welfare programs, but
it is clear that Congress was sufficiently concerned about one form of spillover-opportunistic welfare migration-that it enacted a prophylactic measure
to mitigate its effects. Having lost that tool to deal with spill-over in Saenz,
Congress now ought to reconsider the role of externalities and their mitigation.
More generally, the devolution debate ought to consider issues of externalities
in welfare-what they are, how to measure them, and how to deal with themin sorting out the appropriate division of responsibilities between the federal
and state governments.
3. The Mobility Assumption
Finally, we ought to reconsider the mobility assumption in the devolution
debate. Unfortunately-and despite the amount of discussion and research
about it-the most we can say is that we do not really know whether
opportunistic welfare migration exists or to what extent it impacts state welfare
programs. 98 The mobility assumption ought to remain a part of the debate, at
least to the extent that we continue to examine how and why people migrate
from state to state. But it ought to be merely one of several sorting principles-not the sole sorting principle-for welfare federalism.
Including the knowledge assumption and externalities alongside the
mobility assumption as three endogenous sorting principles results in a more
complex set of possibilities for welfare federalism. These endogenous
considerations seem obvious considering their importance in Tiebout's original
model; their inclusion here serves to illustrate the paucity of considerations in
the current debate and to illustrate some of the possibilities for a richer
federalism. These points are underscored by considering candidates for
exogenous sorting principles.

a transboundary harm demands some form of overarching governmental action across the
scope of the harm.").
97 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
98 See Schram et al., supra note 46, at 227 ("[O]ur analysis provides a basis for
questioning whether there are either significant causes or effects concerning welfare
migration."); BRUECKNER, supra note 38, at 24 (concluding the evidence regarding welfare
migration is mixed). Compare Scott W. Allard & Sheldon Danziger, Welfare Magnets: Myth
or Reality, 62 J. POL. 350, 363 (2000) ("[W]e find very little evidence to support the
hypothesis that states with high welfare benefits retain a greater percentage of single-parent
welfare receipients than states with lower benefits. We find more migration to lower-benefit
states than to higher-benefit states."), with PETERSON & RoM, supra note 46, at 82-83
(asserting that welfare migration exists).
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Exogenous SortingPrinciples

The myopia of the current debate becomes even more acute if we consider
sorting principles outside the Tiebout model. These principles-political
participation, community, and equality and justice-are designed to include
considerations beyond those merely economic in the devolution debate and,
thus, fill clear gaps in the neo-Tieboutian assumptions and rhetoric. This
section seeks to sketch out these three principles and some of the federalism
implications that may flow from them.
1. PoliticalParticipation

One of the key problems with the neo-Tieboutian rhetoric is that it fails to
account for the poor as civic actors and citizens in a democracy. The
jurisdictional competition model contemplates that citizens, including the poor,
register preferences exclusively via migration-that citizens vote with their
feet. It further assumes that governments respond to citizen preferences, as
expressed exclusively through migratory patterns, by offering tax-benefit
packages that attract an optimal level of citizens. In this marketplace for public
goods, policy simply reflects the equilibrium tax-benefit packages that the
government-sellers negotiate with the citizen-buyers. And the buyers' exclusive
leverage in this negotiation is their power to walk away-to redirect their tax
resources to a jurisdiction that better meets their tax-benefit preferences.
Individuals in this model-and especially poor individuals, who lack the same,
or perhaps any, leverage to walk away-are not full citizens with all the
attendant rights and duties in a democracy; instead, they are mere economic
actors in a game ofjurisdictional competition.
The neo-Tieboutian rhetoric of the devolution debate strips individuals,
particularly the poor, of their identity as diverse citizens and instead considers
only their economic choices in the market for public goods as a proxy for their
preferences for public goods. It does this by failing to account for the myriad
alternative, non-economic ways of registering preferences in our democracy.
For example, jurisdictional competition theory fails to account adequately for
the roles of voting, participating, and aggregating preferences through interest
group politics in registering preferences and shaping policy. Most simply, it
assumes that if an individual resides within a jurisdiction, that individual's
residence alone registers a preference for the tax-benefit package offered in the
jurisdiction, even if the individual consistently votes against and advocates
against the jurisdiction's policies. Rather than considering citizens as voters,
active participants, or interest group members, jurisdictional competition theory
treats individuals only as economic beings, ignoring the civic identities of
citizens and the tools available to them to influence policy in a democracy.
Because the theory fails to account for individuals' civic identities, it also
fails to account for civic differences. The theory fails to consider the many
individual and group characteristics that contribute to civic inequality, e.g.,
race, gender, age, class, and geographic location, just to name a few. Instead,
by neutralizing individuals' civic identities, the theory equalizes those
identities: by holding civic identity constant and considering individuals only in
an economic space, the theory holds not only that civic identity, but also civic
difference, is irrelevant in predicting and fashioning policy. For example, the
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theory treats voting and non-voting individuals in the same jurisdiction as each
registering the same preference, irrespective of their votes and their civic
inequality, solely by virtue of their residence within the jurisdiction.
By failing to consider civic identity and civic inequality, the theory thus
allows economic identity to crowd out civic identity, 99 as if economic decisions
in a jurisdictional competition world were a perfect proxy for preferences
expressed through the more conventional channel of civic engagement. The
simple examples above, and countless real-world experiences, illustrate that
economic decisions are not such a close proxy, and the policy predictions in the
jurisdictional competition model are therefore imperfect. Thus by failing to
account for civic identity, jurisdictional competition theory can only predict, at
best, a very imperfect equilibrium tax-benefit package for any jurisdiction,
because it ignores other important civic factors that contribute to policy
development.
Moreover, jurisdictional competition theory fails to account for economic
inequalities. By ignoring inequalities, the theory seems to equalize individuals
across classes, failing to account for the disparate impact on policy
development among individuals or groups of different means. For example, the
theory seems to predict that an individual of modest means registers his or her
preferences via migration-and thus influences policy-as strongly as an
individual of considerable means. This simply cannot be the case; under a pure
economic model, such as the jurisdictional competition model, a relatively
wealthy individual can always influence the market more than a relatively poor
individual, because local jurisdictions benefit more from wealthy individuals.
Jurisdictional competition fails to account for the different abilities to register
preferences and influence policy that must result with market actors of different
means; it thus fails to predict an accurate equilibrium tax-benefit package.
The failure of the theory to account for civic identities and civic and
economic inequalities particularly skews the model on issues of redistribution
to the poor. First, because the poor, by definition, lack resources and means,
they are unable to register preferences in a jurisdictional competition world as
strongly as others with means; migration of the poor in order to express a
preference registers much lower than migration of the rich, because the poor
are relatively less desirable and important to local jurisdictions. But the
jurisdictional competition theory seems not to distinguish between poor and
rich in predicting an equilibrium tax-benefit package based on individuals'
migratory patterns. It thus overstates the influence of the poor in registering
preferences and provides an imperfect predictor of policy.
Alternatively, we might consider the poor in their role as beneficiaries of
public largess, not as taxpaying individuals. We encounter a similar limitation
in the jurisdictional competition theory, but here it understates the influence of
the poor. This alternative assumes that states treat the poor solely as a drag on
the public fisc, not as preference-registering taxpayers. This ignores the

99 As suggested here, the jurisdictional competition model also objectifies individuals
as economic-not civic, social, or human-beings. This alone raises many interesting and
troubling ethical issues, but they are beyond the scope of my narrow project in this Article.
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jurisdictional competition methods that even the poor register preferences, for
example, by paying sales taxes. The jurisdictional competition model thus
understates the influence of the poor in registering preferences under this
alternative. The point here, of course, is not to attempt to quantify the ability of
the poor to register (or not) preferences as compared to the rich; rather, the
point is simply to discuss the inherent mismatch between the jurisdictional
competition predictions and actual policy as a result of the theory's failure to
account for economic differences.
Next, by ignoring the ability of the poor to register preferences through
political engagement, the jurisdictional competition model fails to predict their
registration of preferences. Because the poor generally have a diminished
ability to influence policy through civic engagement, the theory, by neutralizing
and equalizing civic identity, tends to overstate the impact of the poor on policy
development. By focusing exclusively on migration as the vehicle with which
to express preferences, the theory assumes away any civic vehicle for
expressing preferences. But these civic vehicles are likely to be employed
relatively effectively by the non-poor, and they are likely to be employed
relatively ineffectively, if at all, by the poor. By equalizing the poor and the
non-poor in civic space, jurisdictional competition overstates the impact of the
poor on policy.
Consider, for example, the many public debates about welfare reformincluding the devolution debate-and the conspicuous absence of voices of the
poor in those debates. Welfare reform policy is shaped by academics, policy
analysts, and primarily policy-makers, but certainly not the poor. The poor have
a relative and profound disadvantage in registering policy preferences through
political channels. By ignoring this reality-and by assuming that every
individual has an equal opportunity to register preferences through (and only
through) migration-jurisdictional competition theory tends to overstate the
impact of the poor on policy. It therefore provides an imperfect model for
predicting an equilibrium tax-benefit package.
Jurisdictional competition theory thus reduces individuals to their
economic beings and considers them only in an economic space. Because it
ignores important differences in civic space that impact the development of
policy, its predictions must be imperfect or subject to qualification.
The devolution debate, therefore, ought to include considerations of
political participation. At a minimum, the debate should consider how the neoTieboutian predictions need to be adjusted to account for the political and civic
ways in which all citizens register their preferences. For example, the debate
should consider the following questions: How does the relative lack of political
power of the poor distort the jurisdictional competition predictions? How does
the relative political influence of the rich distort these predictions? At what
levels of government do the poor and the rich have comparative advantages in
registering their preferences via political engagement?
The answers to these and other, related questions will result in one of two
situations. First, as is most likely, we may discover that jurisdictional
competition overvalues the local political influence of the poor by ignoring
political influence. In other words, by failing to account for relative differences
in local political influence (and thus by equating political influence of the poor
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with influence of the rich), the model overstates the influence of the poor. By
including political participation as a new variable in a grander model, the new
model may thus predict an even greater desire among the states to cut welfare
benefits-greater, that is, than states' desire under "race to the bottom." Absent
some kind of local political equalizing mechanism-and in order to offset local
political disparities-this new model may thus argue in favor of retaining
greater federal control over levels of benefits, administrative access to benefits,
requirements for the receipt of benefits, and other elements of benefits
programs that states may tend to cut or restrict, given the even lesser ability of
the poor to register preferences through conventional political channels.
Alternatively, as seems less likely, we may discover that jurisdictional
competition undervalues local political participation among the poor and local
(as opposed to national) support for public welfare programs. Perhaps citizens
register a greater degree of support for these programs at the local level than the
model predicts. If this is the case, the model may underestimate the degree to
which states match citizen preferences for these programs, and "race-to-thebottom" rhetoric may be overstated, or at least imprecise. This result may argue
in favor of policies that promote freer migration at the state and federal
levels-or at least against migration barriers, notwithstanding the fact that the
Court in Saenz v. Roe found them unconstitutional-because concerns about
the drawbacks of free migration are overstated, and states will match citizen
preferences.
Under either scenario, there are important policy implications given the
adjustments to the neo-Tieboutian predictions based on a political analysis. The
exact effects of the ability of the poor to register preferences through the
political process are not clear'°°--more work needs to be done to tease out
these issues-but it is clear that a neo-Tieboutian model fails to fully
encompass the distorting effects of poverty on policy development. Political
participation therefore ought to be a part of the devolution debate in order to
help sort out the appropriate roles for federal and state governments in welfare
programs.
2. Community
Community is another notably absent term in the lexicon of the devolution
debate, and, in many ways, it is closely related to civic participation. The neoTieboutian debate thus ignores the poor as members of community. The idea of
community in the context of welfare federalism asks: Through which level of
government do we best reflect our community values relating to welfare? Is the
expression of values relating to public welfare part of our national community
identity? Or is it constituent of our state community identity? More simply:
Which "we"-the national "we" or the state "we"-defines the relevant
community for purposes of welfare programs? Are there particular and discrete

100 For a related analysis, see Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the
Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 552,
618-626 (1999) (arguing for a framework of national standards in welfare to help insulate
the disadvantaged poor from the "tyranny of the majority" in the states).
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aspects of welfare that are more closely associated with our national or state
community identities? 0 1
Historically, welfare programs have accounted for questions of
community: these programs have been designed to address particular
community problems at the local community level or at the national community
level or both. History thus provides some insights. For example, in the period
of American history prior to the New Deal, welfare and poor relief were a
matter of local concern. By the mid 19th century, local communities had long
provided "outdoor relief'-assistance to poor and destitute people in their
homes. In addition, some poor were auctioned to local farmers, and othersstrangers to the local community-were expelled from the town. By 1850,
specialized residential institutions began to spring up in local communities.
These were designed to cut off the poor from corrupting influences that led to
their poverty in the first place, to rehabilitate the poor by transforming behavior
and personalities, and to inculcate habits and ethics of work. 102
These earlier forms of welfare thus located their nuclei in the local
community. This made some sense: given the close identification and
affiliation that citizens at the time had with their more local spheres of
community, local control over welfare programs would seem to best reflect and
promote the values of citizens' primary communities. Local communities were
the primary site of citizens' economic, civic, and social activities, and local
communities exhibited a relatively greater level of cohesion and stickiness for
both poor and non-poor citizens. Individuals associated with their local
communities and the local poor more than they associated with the national
community or the poor in distant communities. Their reaction to poverty on a
local level was a reflection of their local community values (whatever we think
about those values today). Because poverty was a local problem, local
community solutions would best reflect the relevant local community values.
The post-New Deal welfare programs, in contrast, located their nuclei in
the national community. This also made some sense: poverty was increasingly
becoming a nationalized issue, and the national community was best situated to
address it. The increasingly nationalized causes of poverty--e.g., the Great
Depression and other nationalized causes of economic fluctuations and
poverty-demanded a response by the federal community. 1° 3 Moreover,
increased interstate migration and increased channels of interstate
communications resulted in a relative rise in the importance of broader spheres
of community, outside the more pedestrian local communities. And a 20th
century marked by major events of a national, not state or local, scale helped
create a broader federal community in which national values and sentiments
101 Note that these questions do not assume a communitarian justification for welfare or
attempt to justify welfare based on communitarian principles. See, e.g., GOODIN, supra note
20, at 70-118 (arguing against a communitarian justification for welfare). Rather, they
assume some justification for welfare (because it exists), and ask what levels of
government-i.e., what communities-best comprise the values of welfare.
102 MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 10-11 (rev. ed. 1996).
1o3 See id. at 220-31.
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trumped state and local values and sentiments, especially in economic and
security matters. Poverty thus became a relatively national problem within the
national community.
The nationalized nature of poverty that gave rise to post-New Deal welfare
programs has not dissipated. And our national community sentiments,
especially as they relate to economic matters, have only increased in the late
20th and early 21st centuries. Poverty and welfare are issues of concern for our
national community. At the same time, local communities remain deeply
involved in issues related to poverty and welfare, and local community
sentiments ought to be accounted for.
In addition to considering these positive historical trends about community
and welfare, we ought to also deal with the normative questions about the kinds
of communities we wish to form on the national, state, and local levels. For
example: Do we wish support for our poor to be a part of our national
community identity? Should it be limited to the identities of state and local
communities? Or perhaps we seek some more sophisticated balance that
permits support to be constituent of each community. There are, of course,
scores of related questions and issues. My purpose here is not to delineate them
and certainly not to answer them. Rather, I mean only to suggest that these
questions and issues ought to be a part of the devolution debate.
3. Equality and Justice
Finally, questions of equality and justice are present in the devolution
debate only by virtue of their presence in the broader, substantive debates about
welfare reform. For example, the issue of federal entitlement has been an
important part of the broader welfare reform debate. The federal entitlement
protected some measure of equality and justice by ensuring certain federal
standards in welfare programs across states and local jurisdictions. But the
narrower devolution debate is rarely couched in terms of entitlement, federal or
state. Here, I do not intend to focus narrowly on issues related to entitlement;
instead I intend to raise questions of equality and justice as they relate to larger
questions about the appropriate levels of government to preserve these
principles, through entitlement or otherwise. These questions are, of course,
closely related to issues of community, as part of the questions ask: Which
communities-federal, state, or local-value which kinds of equality and
which kinds of justice?
Begin with the less controversial issue of equality:' °4 What level of
government best preserves equality across state and local jurisdictions in the
allocation and administration of welfare programs? Consider two welfare
recipients in different state or local jurisdictions and subject to different welfare
benefits and administrative schemes. Under a devolved system, one recipient
might receive lower benefits, be subject to higher or more onerous

104 1

use here a simple and relatively non-controversial definition of equality, adjusted

for local situations: similarly situated individuals ought not to be treated significantly
differently in welfare programs, after accounting for local variations in such things as cost of
living, local economies, and the like. Of course, this leaves much open to debate. But that is
exactly the point: these issues ought to be a part of the debate.
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requirements, and be subject to greater administrative barriers than the other
recipient from a different jurisdiction. We might observe differences like this
even under a system of "adjusted equality" that accounts for legitimate
variances in local conditions, such as differences in local costs of living. Prodevolutionists claim that such disparate treatment is a reflection of local
considerations, while anti-devolutionists claim that it is evidence of a "race to
the bottom." But neither side seems to consider the differences in the context of
federalism: which level of government is best suited to define and preserve
equality, or adjusted equality, across jurisdictions?
If equality is an important consideration at the state level of government or
community-i.e., equality across welfare programs within the state-perhaps
states are best suited to define and preserve equality within their borders (for
they have no direct control over programs outside their borders). Inequality
may arise within states that practice "double devolution," or further devolution
of welfare program functions downward away from the state government and
toward local governments, thus creating an environment where inequalities
across local jurisdictions within a state are possible or even likely. Equality
minded states may seek to equalize benefit levels, program requirements, and
administrative burdens across local jurisdictions based on some formula that
accounts for local costs of living, local economic conditions, and the like. In
fact, states, as entities closest to the local governments and the local situations,
may have a comparative advantage over the federal government in acting as the
equalizing force. But under a block-grant form of federalism that caps federal
funding and penalizes states for failing to meet standards such as work
participation rates, states lack financial incentives to promote equality.
Moreover, as the entities closest to the local governments and local situations,
states may be more receptive to political considerations that actually promote
inequality. Thus, the federal government may have a comparative advantage as
the equalizing force in these situations.
If equality is an important consideration at the federal level-i.e., equality
in programs across states-the federal government clearly has a comparative
advantage in defining and preserving it. Consider a state that underfunds its
welfare program or imposes harsher requirements relative to programs in other
states, thus raising equality issues across states. The relatively stingier state has
no financial incentive to increase funding under a block-grant devolution
system, and it has no direct control over the programs in other states. Neither
can other states directly impact the behavior of the stingier state; only the
federal government can provide the incentives to promote equality.
Consider alternatively a state that overfunds its welfare program or relaxes
its requirements relative to programs in other states. Presumably, a relatively
generous state behaves thus for a reason-community values, historical norms,
or economic or political considerations unique to that state-and these
considerations outweigh. the financial benefit to the state in providing less
generous programs. Given this calculation, the relatively generous state is
unlikely to reduce benefits out of equality concerns for recipients in other
states. And less generous states have no incentive to increase their own benefits
to promote equality with the generous state. No state can directly impact the
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behavior of any other state to promote equality; again, only the federal
government can provide incentives to promote equality between states.
States, by their nature, lack the capabilities of dealing with these equality
issues in welfare programs within and across states; the federal government
seems to have a comparative advantage in this arena. But I do not mean to
imply that states ought not to play a role in defining and promoting equality
within states or among states. I mean only to suggest that equality definitions
and standards ought to be considerations in the devolution debate to allow that
debate to sort these considerations out.
Next consider the more controversial issue of justice, defined more
generally than equality: What level of government is best situated to define and
promote standards of justice and fairness in welfare programs? Consider first
procedural justice, or fairness as it relates to the process of applying for and
receiving benefits. Certainly a component of procedural justice is relative
fairness, or equality, discussed above in general terms. But another component
of procedural justice is objective fairness of process, i.e., a fair process for any
recipient, or a bare minimum standard, irrespective of equality
considerations.105 Because welfare programs at issue in this Article, devolved
or not, are generally jointly funded by the federal and state governments, it
seems reasonable that both federal and state governments would assert an
interest in objective procedural fairness and that both levels of government
ought therefore to establish and enforce such standards.
Consider next substantive justice, or fairness in the benefit level and
program requirements such as work requirements. Like procedural justice,
substantive justice contains an element of relative fairness, or equality,
discussed above in general terms. But it also contains an element of objective
fairness in the level of benefits, i.e., an objectively fair level of benefits (a bare
minimum) and fair requirements (maxima, perhaps), irrespective of equality.
States may enjoy a comparative advantage in determining these standards by
virtue of their specialized knowledge of local conditions, but the federal
government may also assert an interest by virtue of its desire to reflect federal
community standards in its welfare programs.
At bottom, considerations of equality and justice may point in various,
even contradictory, directions. But the absence of considerations of equality
and justice in the devolution debate has resulted in a paucity of options for
welfare federalism. (Re)introducing these concepts into the debate will result in
a wider, more diverse range of federalism options as policymakers continue to
consider devolution in welfare programs.
V. CONCLUSION
The two sides in the current welfare devolution debate seem to argue
inexorably toward two polar positions of complete federal control on the one
side versus complete devolution on the other. In support of these positions, the
sides rely on a rhetoric that seems almost intuitively narrow: the anti105 See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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devolutionists argue against devolution based on "race to the bottom" and
"welfare magnet" predictions; the pro-devolutionists argue for devolution based
on "experimentation," "responsiveness to local needs and desires," and even
"race-to-the-top" theories. We may trace the intellectual roots of these
arguments to a single assumption-the mobility assumption-in Charles
Tiebout's famous 1956 article, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, and thus
reveal the paucity of considerations or principles that feed the debate.
By expanding the debate beyond the sole principle of Tiebout's mobility
assumption, we gain an appreciation for the .rich possibilities in welfare
federalism that are lost in the current debate. By looking beyond mobility, we
may discover additional principles that help sort out the complex and
appropriate roles for the federal and state governments in the design and
implementation of welfare programs.
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